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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, as the U.S. Supreme Court has steadily closed the 
courthouse doors to class actions in the United States,2 an increasing 
number of foreign jurisdictions have adopted some form of 
representative group proceeding along the lines of a modern class action.  
Perhaps not surprisingly given the roots of the American class action in 
England’s medieval group litigation,3 outside the United States, class 
action procedures were adopted in the common-law jurisdictions of 
Australia and Canada before most civil law jurisdictions followed suit 
(Quebec, the Francophone Canadian province that is governed by civil 
law, is the exception to this generalization: it adopted a class action 
                                                          
 1.   Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School.  This essay 
draws on my  
contributions to the co-edited book, CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS SHAPE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION (Deborah Hensler, Christopher Hodges & Ianika 
Tzankova eds., 2016) [hereinafter CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT]. 
 2.   See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 
(2013); Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097 (2013).  Cases interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 certification requirements in 
a more restrictive fashion than previous holdings or otherwise restricting plaintiffs’ ability to 
proceed in a class form include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (vacating 
certification of a class of female employees, applying a heightened commonality standard); Comcast 
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (vacating certification of an anti-trust class, on the grounds 
that the damage model did not fit the class definition); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding the validity of an arbitration clause denying consumers’ right to proceed 
in class form); and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding that 
prohibiting class members from proceeding in a collective arbitration procedure when such a 
prohibition effectively denies plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their rights is not sufficient to void the 
arbitration provision).  Arguably, in more recent cases, a majority of Supreme Court justices have 
rejected efforts to further restrict rights of plaintiffs to proceed in class form.  E.g., Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (maintaining “fraud on the market” as a 
substitution for individual reliance in securities litigation, thereby allowing plaintiffs to offer proof 
of commonality); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (holding that representative 
plaintiff’s rejection of an offer of settlement does not automatically moot the litigation). 
 3.   See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (describing the modern class action’s relationship with medieval 
group litigation).  
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procedure in 1978).4  Australia and Canada will both celebrate the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of their class action procedures in 2017, twenty-
five years after the 1966 birth of the modern U.S. class action.  However, 
the spread of class action procedures globally began in earnest in the 
2000s.  Today, at least thirty-five jurisdictions in addition to Australia, 
Canada, and the United States, including twenty-one of the twenty-five 
largest economies in the world, permit class actions for some or all legal 
claims (See Table 1).5  These procedures are authorized by statute, rule, 
or, in some instances, by constitutions or judicial decisions.  The 
procedures differ in many respects; their common feature is that they 
allow one or a few persons or entities to represent a large number of 
similarly situated claimants in a legal action seeking a substantive 
remedy.  This procedural form differs sharply from traditional court-
based dispute resolution, involving one or a few claimants suing one or a 
few defendants for relief.  It also differs from traditional joinder, in 
which multiple parties are before the court.  Typically, in a representative 
class action, save for the class representative, the class members are 
“absent parties.” 
In this essay, I discuss the possible reasons for this remarkable 
diffusion of a “legal transplant,” identify the key features of the 
procedures that influence the extent and nature of their application, 
discuss alternatives to class actions such as aggregated group 
proceedings and administrative compensation schemes, and consider the 
implications for the future of the global expansion of collective litigation.  
                                                          
 4.   W.A. Bogart, Questioning Litigation’s Role—Courts and Class Actions in Canada, 62 Ind. 
L.J. 665, 685–89 (1987). 
 5.  See generally CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1.  There is no official compendium 
of jurisdictions with class actions.  With colleagues in Europe, I have been monitoring the spread of 
class actions over the last decade. 
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Table 1 
COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED A CLASS ACTION 

















Mexico Bolivia Bulgaria  China 
United 
States 





 Costa Rica Finland  South Korea 
 Colombia France  Taiwan 
 Ecuador Israel  Thailand 
 Panama Italy   
 Peru Lithuania   
 Uruguay Netherlands   
 Venezuela Norway   
  Poland   
  Portugal   
  Spain   
  Sweden   
  Ukraine   
                                                          
 6.   The European Commission has adopted non-binding “Principles on Collective Redress,” 
the term adopted in Europe to distinguish their approach to collective litigation from the American 
class action.  See Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning 
violations of rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU), OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (July 26, 2013) [hereinafter European Commissions Principles on Collective Redress], 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN.  
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II.  WHAT EXPLAINS THE SPREAD OF CLASS ACTIONS? 
Because the modern class action was first adopted in the United 
States and because most jurisdictions that have adopted the class action 
in the last decade refer to the “American class action” as a model, if not 
to emulate then to avoid, it is reasonable to view class actions outside the 
United States as “legal transplants.”  There is rich literature on the global 
diffusion of ideas and practices generally, and the diffusion of legal 
policies and practices in particular.7  Scholars have proposed a variety of 
explanations for such diffusion, including coercion by external forces, 
simple emulation, rational policy making, and competition.  No one has 
yet undertaken a systematic analysis of the causes for the spread of class 
actions, but it appears to be the result of a mix of factors including some 
but not all of the above. 
Imperialists took their legal norms and practices to the nations they 
conquered, often adapting them so as to serve their own interests.  There 
is no example, however, of a country that has adopted a class action 
procedure as a result of coercion by external forces; to the extent that 
external forces have been at work, it has been to oppose the adoption of a 
class action in a new jurisdiction.8  There is some evidence of simple 
emulation in the timing of class action adoption: once one country in a 
region has adopted a class action, it appears to be more likely that others 
will follow.  For example, an early wave of adoption of class actions in 
Northern Europe was only recently followed by a similar wave in 
Western Europe, and the pattern is now extending itself in Central and 
Eastern Europe and in Asia.  It is not clear that all these waves of 
adoption were responsive to particular policy challenges.  However, 
these patterns might be explained by rational decision-making in which a 
country facing a problem for which a class action might offer a solution 
                                                          
 7.   See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (1974); MICHELE GRAZIADEI, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2006); Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons & Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: 
Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 449 (2007).  
Although Watson is often cited as the first to propose the term “legal transplant,” he objected to its 
use to describe the spread of legal concepts that spread gradually, rather than as a result of an abrupt 
decision. 
 8.   Deborah Hensler, Can Private Class Actions Enforce Marketplace Regulations? Do They? 
Should They?, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Francesca Bignami & David Waring eds., 2016) [hereinafter 
Hensler, Enforce Marketplace Regulations]. On the campaign by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to 
forestall adoption of class actions outside the United States, see Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party 
Financing of Class Action Litigation in the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 
499 (2014) [hereinafter Hensler Third-Party Financing].  
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looks to its neighbors for an example of successful policy adoption and 
implementation.  The rise of mass claims, which by their nature require a 
collective approach to resolution, is likely an example of the sort of 
challenge that inspires problem-solving efforts.9  The regional spread of 
class actions might also be explained by competition, however; when the 
Netherlands adopted a creative approach to settling mass claims 
collectively and advertised itself as the preferred forum for such 
settlements, it led to discussions in the United Kingdom about assuring 
that its courts did not lose “business” to the Dutch.10  Not as frequently 
discussed in the legal transplant literature is the role of legal education.  
The rise of LLM programs in American law schools targeting 
international students has inadvertently provided the opportunity for 
thousands of foreign legal practitioners to learn about the U.S. class 
action.11  Promoting the adoption of a new high-profile procedure upon 
their return to their home jurisdictions may convey special status and 
lead to new professional opportunities for these (mostly young) 
practitioners.12 
The role of mass claims in propelling the adoption of class actions 
should not be underestimated.  In the United States, courts frequently 
manage mass claims by informal and formal aggregation (e.g. the federal 
multi-district litigation procedure authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and its 
state look-alikes)13 rather than class actions, particularly in personal 
injury and property damage litigation that cannot meet the predominance 
requirement for certification of damage class actions under FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(b)(3).  Most other jurisdictions do not have formal procedures for 
aggregating individual claims (other than the class action), and the case 
management demands of both informal and formal claim aggregation are 
discomforting to judges.14 
                                                          
 9.   On the rise of mass claims, see Deborah Hensler, Justice for the Masses? Aggregate 
Litigation & its Alternatives, 143 DAEDULUS 73, 73–82 (2014) [hereinafter Hensler, Justice for the 
Masses], see also Deborah Hensler, How Economic Globalisation is Helping to Construct a Private 
Transnational Legal Order, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW (Sam 
Muller et al. eds., 2011). 
 10.   Hensler, Enforce Marketplace Regulations, supra note 8, at 241. 
 11.   Id. at 242. 
 12.   For discussion of how diffusion of legal practices internationally may convey power and 
social status to practitioners, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER (1st ed. 1996).  
 13.   Hensler, Justice for the Masses, supra note 9, at 73–82. 
 14.   See generally Ianika N. Tzankova, Case Management: The Stepchild of Mass Claim 
Dispute Resolution, 19 UNIF. L. REV. 329 (2014).  For a discussion of case management in U.S. 
courts, see Steven S. Gensler,  Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 
669 (2010). 
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Today, in most democratic industrialized countries when serious 
injuries or substantial financial losses give rise to mass claims, litigation 
ensues.15  In most jurisdictions, class actions were adopted chiefly to 
facilitate resolving such claims.16  However, facilitating meritorious 
claims that would not otherwise be litigated because the amounts at issue 
are too small has contributed to the adoption of class actions in some 
jurisdictions.  Canada and Australia are two jurisdictions whose class 
action jurisprudence highlights access to justice concerns;17 access to 
justice for small value consumer claims also helped propel the adoption 
of the European Principles on Collective Redress.18  In contrast, 
opposition to the adoption of class action procedures in many 
jurisdictions is grounded on beliefs that providing such a procedure will 
encourage a “flood of frivolous litigation,”19 often perceived as 
comprising small value claims. 
Another possible objective of class actions, private enforcement of 
public regulations (the so-called “private attorney general” theory) is 
more contentious.  The notion of using private litigation to supplement 
legal enforcement by government agencies is familiar to common law 
jurists and legal practitioners and to scholars trained in the economic 
analysis of law, which highlights the deterrence function of civil 
litigation.20  But it is anathema to many in civil law jurisdictions that 
have a long tradition of reliance on public institutions to ensure legal 
compliance.  In recognition of this, during years of European Union 
controversy over the adoption of class actions, representative collective 
procedures were christened “collective redress” mechanisms, and the 
                                                          
 15.   For a discussion of the cultural phenomena of mass claiming, see Byron Stier & Ianika 
Tzankova, The Culture of Collective Litigation: A Comparative Analysis, in CLASS ACTIONS IN 
CONTEXT, supra note 1. 
 16.   See e.g., Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS (Deborah R. Hensler, Christopher Hodges, & Magdalena 
Tulibacka eds., 2009); see also CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1, at 391–93. 
 17.   P. Dawson Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Multiplex Ltd. [2007] 242 ALR 111 (Federal Court of 
Australia) (Austl.); Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.). 
 18.   European Commissions Principles on Collective Redress, supra note 6. 
 19.   John Beisner, Jessica Miller, & Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-
Party Litigation Funding in the United States, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM (2009), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf. 
 20.   See CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1, at 271–72 (briefly discussing deterrence 
theory as it applies to the private enforcement objective of class actions, including citations to key 
literature and court decisions).  Although scholars and lobbyists argue over the appropriate boundary 
to set between public and private enforcement, qualitative case studies of litigation arising after mass 
injuries or losses occur indicate that responses are almost always a mix of public and private action.  
Id. at 259–78 (highlighting the interaction of public and private enforcement observed in qualitative 
case studies of litigation in multiple jurisdictions). 
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European Commission’s Principles on Collective Redress caution against 
(but do not entirely prohibit) using private class actions for regulatory 
enforcement.21 
III.  VARIATIONS IN CLASS ACTION DESIGN 
Not all class actions are created equal.  The key features of class 
action design differ significantly, reflecting both the differences in policy 
objectives discussed above and differences in jurisdictions’ legal history 
and culture.  Moreover, the legal regimes in which class actions operate 
also differ in important respects.  Together these differences in 
procedural features and legal regimes shape the implementation of class 
actions and their outcomes. 
Four differentiating features of class actions have proved most 
important: substantive scope, rules on standing of class representatives, 
whether class members need to proactively join or proactively exclude 
themselves from the collective litigation (“opt-in” versus “opt-out”) and 
availability of monetary remedies. 
Logically, when authority to proceed in class form is trans-
substantive or authorized for many different types of legal claims it is 
more likely that class actions will be filed in court.  Alternatively, when 
the use of class actions is limited to a single area of law, the procedure 
will only be used for claims grounded on that law.  Australia, Canada, 
and the United States are examples of jurisdictions with trans-substantive 
class action procedural rules; Israel’s procedure is not formally trans-
substantive but its use is authorized for a wide range of case types.  
Belgium, Chile, France, and Japan are examples of jurisdictions that 
have adopted class actions for consumer claims.  England recently 
adopted a class action procedure for anti-competition (antitrust) claims.  
Taiwan authorizes class actions for shareholder claims.22  There is some 
evidence that once a legislature (or the judiciary) authorizes a class 
action for one type of claim, the procedure may later be used for other 
types of claims.  Israel’s and France’s current class action regimes reflect 
                                                          
 21.   European Commissions Principles on Collective Redress, supra note 6.  The European 
Commission engaged in long years of controversy over the question of whether to adopt a directive 
mandating the adoption of a class action procedure by member states, during which the Commission 
(and lobbyists) produced multiple reports and tentative recommendations.  Unable to reach 
consensus, in June 2013 the Commission issued a set of recommended principles for designing 
collective litigation mechanisms throughout the EU.  See id. 
 22.  Germany’s group litigation procedure (the KapMuG), which is not a class action, is 
authorized for shareholder claims. 
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this sort of historical expansion.23  The Netherlands’ unique collective 
settlement procedure (the WCAM) was adopted to provide a mechanism 
for resolving product liability claims arising out of health injuries 
associated with the DES drug but was rapidly adopted for use in 
shareholder cases.24 
Table 2 
Key Design Features of Class Actions 











organizations or public 
officials 




Monetary damages as 
well as injunctive or 
declaratory relief 
Injunctive or 
declaratory relief only 
 
Procedures for determining whether it is appropriate for a 
substantively eligible complaint to proceed in class form differ among 
jurisdictions.  Canada and the United States have formal certification 
procedures25, which in the United States have become so strict in recent 
years that the certification process may turn into a mini-trial of the 
merits.  Australia does not require that a judge certify a complaint before 
it can proceed in class form, but if a defendant challenges class treatment 
it will set off a judicial inquiry into whether the characteristics of the 
case —numerous plaintiffs, common issues, etc.—are such that class 
treatment is appropriate.26  In civil law jurisdictions, perhaps because of 
                                                          
 23.   Deborah Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16 (reporting features of different countries’ class-
action regimes) [hereinafter Hensler, Overview].  
 24.   Deborah Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party 
Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 311–13 (2011). 
 25.   Jasminka Kalajdzic, W. A. Bogart & Ian Mathews, Canada, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16.  In the United States, FED. R. CIV. P. 23 specifies the requirements 
for certifying federal class actions. 
 26.   Vince Morabito, Australia, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 16.  
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the recency of adoption of class action procedures, the rules for 
determining whether a case should proceed in class form seem sketchier. 
All of the common-law jurisdictions that have adopted class actions 
to date permit class members (individuals or entities such as businesses) 
to offer themselves as representatives of the class, subject to a judge’s 
determination that the representative’s claims are typical of other class 
members and that they can adequately represent the class members’ 
interests.  In jurisdictions that require certification, adequacy of 
representation is frequently interpreted as referring to the availability of 
financial resources to prosecute the claim—a substantial issue when the 
class is suing a well-resourced domestic or multinational corporation—
and the engagement of legal counsel with expertise in class litigation.  
However, a court’s inquiry into adequacy may also raise the question of 
whether the class members’ interests are sufficiently homogeneous that 
the proposed class representative can represent them without a conflict.  
In Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 
class of asbestos exposed victims were situated so differently that they 
could not be adequately represented by the proposed representative.27  
The holding seemed to sound the death knell for all personal injury class 
actions going forward, but by suggesting that creating separately 
represented “sub-classes” might solve the problem of adverse interests 
within a class, the court left a door open that some class actions have 
been able to march through.28 
Civil law jurisdictions that have adopted class action procedures 
have generally limited standing to represent the class either to public 
officials or quasi-public agencies (the approach of Brazil, Denmark, and 
Taiwan) or to pre-existing associations or special purpose foundations 
(the approach of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Japan).29  The 
theory behind these choices seems to be that class members represented 
by private lawyers are more likely to be susceptible to principal-agent 
conflicts, leading to settlements of claims that will advantage the 
representative plaintiff over the class or the class counsel over class 
members (or both).  However, experience shows that public officials are 
susceptible to political pressures to bring or reject bringing class 
                                                          
 27.   Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997). 
 28.   See In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421 (2016) (upholding class 
certification and approval of a settlement of NFL Players’ personal injury litigation). 
 29.  See generally, Hensler, Overview, supra note 23 (reporting features of different countries’ 
class-action regimes). Chile is an example of a jurisdiction that confers standing on both a public 
agency and individual class members. 
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actions,30 and that non-profit associations and special purpose 
foundations are subject to conflicts of interest as well.31  In brief, agency 
problems are inherent in all forms of collective litigation.32 
Common law and civil law jurisdictions also differ with regard to 
preference for “opt-out” versus “opt-in” class action procedures.  
Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States all have opt-out 
procedures for civil damages class actions, while most of western and 
northern European jurisdictions have adopted opt-in procedures, and the 
European Commission’s recommended principles for so-called collective 
redress mechanisms sternly admonish member states to eschew opt-out 
procedures.33  Notwithstanding this advice, some civil law jurisdictions 
such as Spain—a relatively early adopter—and Lithuania and Poland—
more recent adopters—have chosen the opt-out approach.  The 
Netherlands’ unique collective settlement mechanism (WCAM)—which 
is available only to claimants and defendants who have agreed to settle 
before approaching the court—is also an opt-out mechanism.  The 
principled argument against opt-out class actions is that claimants run the 
risk of losing their right to bring a claim if they are unaware that they 
have been included in a certified class that has disposed of all class 
members’ claims.  Requirements to provide extensive notice, both on an 
individual and mass basis, are intended to mitigate this problem,34 but as 
a practical matter there will always be a possibility that some class 
members are swept into an opt-out class action without realizing that this 
has occurred.  Notwithstanding the importance of these normative and 
practical concerns, in reality opposition to opt-out class actions is driven 
                                                          
 30.   See Agustin Barroilhet, Self-Interested Gatekeeping? Clashes Between Public and Private 
Enforcers in two Chilean Class Actions, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1; see also 
Kuo-Chang Huang, 
Using Associations as a Vehicle for Class Action: The Case of Taiwan, in CLASS ACTIONS IN 
CONTEXT, supra note 1.  
 31.   Ianika Tzankova, Everything You Wanted to Know about Dutch Foundations but Never 
Dared to Ask: A Checklist for Investors, TILBURG LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES  (Feb. 10, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730618.  For 
examples of recent Dutch Foundations established to seek damages on behalf of investors, see BP 
INVESTOR CLAIMS FOUNDATION,  https://bpinvestorfoundation.com/, and THE VOLKSWAGEN 
INVESTOR SETTLEMENT FOUNDATION, http://volkswageninvestorsettlement.com/governance/.  
See also Ianika Tzankova, Collective Redress in Vie d’Or: A Reflection on a European Cultural 
Phenomenon, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1, at 117–36 
 32.   While agency issues may also arise in litigation between single represented parties, there is 
good reason to believe that the potential for conflict between class counsel and the class they 
represent is greater, because of the difficulty absent parties face in monitoring their representatives.  
 33.  See European Commissions Principles on Collective Redress, supra note 6. 
 34.   On the relationship of due process to notice in class actions in U.S. law, see Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
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largely by interest group politics: sophisticated parties understand that 
opt-out classes are likely to be larger than opt-in classes because (as 
demonstrated by empirical studies35) individuals are less likely to 
proactively take steps to join an activity than to passively allow 
themselves to be included in the activity.  As a result, opt-out class 
actions give the class (and class counsel) more leverage against 
defendants. 
Finally, all jurisdictions that provide for collective litigation offer 
injunctive or declaratory relief as a remedy, but many restrict class 
members’ ability to collect money damages.36  The rationale for the 
restriction on money damages relates to the rationale for opt-in 
provisions: if money is at stake, class members arguably have a greater 
stake in pursuing an individual claim.  The politics of the debate over 
remedies also matches the politics of the debate over opt-out versus opt-
in: if those who have suffered a loss as a result of a defendant’s legal 
violation can band together to pursue a remedy, they are more likely to 
be successful; hence, permission to proceed collectively increases the 
likelihood that defendants will be called to account for bad behavior.37  
Moreover, when there is an expectation of money damages, 
entrepreneurial lawyers, membership organizations, and special purpose 
foundations are all more likely to believe it is worthwhile to invest 
resources in pursuing legal claims. 
Allowing money damages in class actions creates challenges when 
the class is large and when losses vary among class members.  Even 
when common issues of law and fact justify collective treatment, 
allocating damages obtained at trial or in settlement to individual class 
                                                          
 35.  Health and education policy researchers have conducted systematic research on differences 
in participation rates using active (i.e. opt-in) versus passive (i.e. opt-out) consent.  Generally, 
researchers find higher participation rates under passive consent conditions albeit little differences in 
the characteristics of the participant groups.  See, e.g.  Suzanne Spence et al. Does the use of passive 
or active consent affect consent or completion rates, or dietary data quality? Repeat cross-sectional 
survey among school children aged 11–12 years, 2015 BMJ OPEN (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/5/1/e006457.info. 
 36.   See generally Hensler, Overview, supra note 23. 
 37.   This understanding produced the drive in the United States to include arbitration 
provisions prohibiting any form of collective proceeding in a wide range of consumer, employment, 
and other business contracts.  In the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld such 
contractual provisions. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding 
the validity of an arbitration clause denying consumers’ right to proceed in class form); see also Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding that prohibiting class members 
from proceeding in a collective arbitration procedure when such a prohibition effectively denies 
plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their rights is not sufficient to void the arbitration provision).  In 
Europe, including mandatory arbitration clauses in form contracts is considered a violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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members may impose logistical challenges.  Precise eligibility and loss 
determination rules must be designed and communicated to class 
members and systems devised for delivering payments. In some 
circumstances in the United States, plaintiff and defense counsel have 
collaborated on designing special purpose facilities for delivering 
compensation to mass tort claimants.38 
However, in consumer class actions and other financial damage class 
actions, it appears more common for the parties or lawyers to contract 
with for-profit claims administration companies to administer class 
settlements.  Civil law judges have little experience addressing the 
distribution of monetary compensation, which may contribute to 
wariness in civil law jurisdictions about permitting class actions for 
money damages.  Ironically, the politics in Europe that have promoted 
the use of class actions for “collective redress” rather than regulatory 
enforcement may promote the development of effective approaches to 
delivering compensation to claimants in mass litigation, which might in 
turn encourage more jurisdictions to expand class action remedies to 
include money damages. 
Taken together, broad authorization for class actions, rules granting 
standing to class members, opt-out provisions, and availability of money 
damages all make it more likely that class action procedures will actually 
be used in the jurisdictions that have adopted them, rather than remain 
simply “law on the books.”  At least as important as each of these 
features, however, is the legal financing regime within which the class 
action procedure must operate.39  Class actions, like all complex lawsuits, 
are expensive.  Without adequate resources, class representatives, 
whether individuals or associations (and even whether private or public), 
cannot effectively prosecute class actions and are therefore unlikely to 
even attempt to use the procedure. 
United States legal financing rules are the most favorable to class 
litigation: lawyers are permitted to bring class actions on a speculative 
basis, meaning that they can invest their own resources and if successful 
                                                          
 38.   See generally Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims 
Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 113, (1990) (describing these special purpose 
facilities); Deborah Hensler, Assessing Claims Resolution Facilities: What We Need to Know, 54 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 175 (1991); Deborah Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced 
Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429 (2005); Francis McGovern, The What and Why 
of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2005). 
 39.   For comparative information on fee regimes, see NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN EUROPE (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010) and THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF 
CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer  & 
Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010). 
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earn a premium on their investment. 40 Moreover, under the “American 
fee rule” that specifies that each side will bear its own litigation costs, 
neither the class nor class counsel faces the threat of adverse costs.  
Under equitable fee doctrine, if the class prevails all of the class 
members will pay a share of attorney fees and expenses proportionate to 
the damages they obtain, eliminating the potential for free-riding.  
Bringing a class action is still a high-stakes investment for lawyers, since 
if defendants prevail the class counsel will receive nothing to cover his or 
her time or expenses.  Furthermore, the class counsel is not permitted to 
set his or her own fee, because in class actions, unlike ordinary civil 
litigation, the judge decides what the prevailing class counsel will 
receive.41  Nonetheless, an experienced class action litigator can expect 
to achieve financial success by carefully selecting and prosecuting class 
actions.42 
This is less true in other jurisdictions.  In most Canadian provinces, 
class counsel may charge contingent fees (although judges provide some 
oversight of fee arrangements), but class members do face adverse costs.  
In a few Canadian provinces, including Ontario and Quebec, public 
funds have been established to take on the risk of adverse costs.  The 
funds are replenished by charging successful class members a small 
fraction of the total award or settlement for the class.43 
In Australia, lawyers are allowed to represent a class representative 
on a “no win, no pay” basis but are barred from charging fees based on 
the amount obtained for the class and the class representative faces 
adverse costs if the defendant prevails.  Successful class counsel may 
receive an “upcharge” on their hourly fees but that is limited to twenty-
five percent.  The class representative is legally responsible for the full 
adverse costs if defendants prevail and class members other than the 
representative have no obligation to contribute to paying class counsel if 
the class prevails, creating an obvious “free-rider” problem.44  In most 
                                                          
 40.  On funding of U.S. class actions generally, see THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 
supra note 16, at 22–23. 
 41.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). Depending on fee doctrine within the federal circuit, in federal 
courts class counsel fees will either be awarded on a percentage-of-fund basis or on a “lodestar” 
basis (hours x hourly rate x multiplier). Across all federal class action settlements in recent years, 
class counsel fees averaged about twenty-two percent of negotiated settlement funds, with the 
percent declining as the size of the fund increased.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 248 (2010) and Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and their 
Fee Awards, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010). 
 42.  Hensler, Overview, supra note 23, at 23–24.  
 43.  Id. at 24. 
 44.  Id.  
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civil law jurisdictions, there is no provision for “no win, no pay” legal 
representation of the class; class counsel must charge on an hourly basis 
(although in some jurisdictions “success fees” are permitted on top of 
hourly charges), the class representative faces adverse costs and there is 
no scheme for avoiding free-rider problems.45 
As a result of legal financing regimes, the prospects for class actions 
in many jurisdictions seem grim, however friendly to claimants the class 
action procedures themselves may appear.  The reality, however, is 
considerably more propitious: in response to restrictions on fees and to 
adverse cost rules, third-party funders have appeared, first in Australia 
and now in Europe, Canada, and even the United States (where such 
financing seems least necessary).  These third-party funders take 
different forms and apply different protocols, but in class actions the 
general approach is for third-parties to contract with individual class 
members to pay lawyer fees (while the litigation is ongoing) and take on 
the risk of adverse costs.46  In return, the class members agree to pay the 
funders a hefty share of any damages they obtain; as the funders are not 
themselves lawyers, they are not barred from charging such contingent 
fees and in most jurisdictions to date their charges have not been 
regulated.  Third-party financers are themselves funded by hedge funds, 
high-value individuals, and others looking for attractive investment 
opportunities that are not correlated with trends in the capital markets.  
Third-party funding works well in opt-in class action regimes where 
class members must identify themselves in order to join the litigation and 
in regimes where standing is limited to pre-existing associations (for 
which third-party funding may operate like a line of credit) and special 
purpose foundations that are legally authorized to enter into such 
financing agreements.  In formally opt-out regimes where class members 
have standing to represent the class, the practical effect of third-party 
funding is to convert the class action to an opt-in procedure.47 
Another “work-around” that has emerged in jurisdictions with 
                                                          
 45.  Id. at 22–23. 
 46.  In the United States, third-party funders have generally asserted they will not fund class 
actions, perhaps in an effort to insure their preferred commercial corporate clients that the funders 
are not a threat.  See Hensler, Third-Party Financing, supra note 8, at 505.  However, over time this 
negative perspective on funding class actions may erode. 
 47.  In Australia, third-party funding was challenged on the basis that it turned what was 
intended as an opt-out regime into an opt-in regime. However, the high court upheld the practice on 
the grounds that it provided access to the court in situations where opt-out class actions were 
financially too risky.  Campbell’s Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) HCA 41(Austl.); 
Fostif Pty Ltd v. Campbell’s Cash and Carry Pty Ltd (2005) NSWCA 83(Austl.); Multiplex Funds 
Management Limited Pty Ltd v. P. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2007) FCAFC 2000 (Austl.).  
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restrictive class action procedures or legal financing regimes—and also 
in some jurisdictions that forbid class actions altogether—is for a 
collection agent to offer to purchase the claims of individual claimants. 
Once claims are assigned to it, the agent can appear in court as a single 
plaintiff.  Funding for entities that have adopted this litigation model is 
also being provided by third-party funders that invest in class actions.48 
Other aspects of legal regimes also may hinder or hamper the use of 
class action procedures. The availability of damages beyond mere 
compensation—for example, punitive damages or disgorgement of 
profits or statutory damages that allow a multiplier of actual damages 
such as “treble damages” under United States anti-trust doctrine—
increase the incentive to file class actions. The potential in the United 
States for a jury trial—however remote—may also increase the incentive 
to file a class action where the likelihood of a favorable jury verdict 
seems great. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO CLASS ACTIONS: GROUP PROCEEDINGS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEMES 
In the United States mass claims that arise out of the same facts and 
law are usually collected and transferred to a single court and judge for 
pre-trial management purposes under the federal multi-district litigation 
statute (MDL).49  Once the transferee judge has ruled on significant 
substantive motions, including motions to dismiss, motions for summary 
judgment, and motions for class certification, as well as admissibility of 
expert evidence and key documents, the litigation usually settles.50  The 
                                                          
 48.  See Online Platform Launched for European Customer Claims against Volksvagen, (April 
24, 2016), http://www.hausfeld.com/news/eu/online-platform-launched-for-european-customer-
claims-against-volkswagen. Michael Hausfeld, a leading American class action lawyer, has 
successfully used this strategy for anti-competition (anti-trust) litigation in Europe. His firm is acting 
for those who assign their claims to the advertised collecting entity; funding to Hausfeld is provided 
by Burford Capital, a leading third-party litigation funder headquartered in New York. 
 49.   28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  Several states have adopted similar rules for consolidating cases 
filed in different courts but arising out of the same facts. These state rules are frequently referred to 
as “coordination rules” See, e.g.,  
22 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit, 22 §202.69; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §404; Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 
13; Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 384. In New Jersey they are referred to as “multicounty litigation rules.”  N.J. 
Rules of Civil Practice, 4:38A.  
 50.   See, e.g. Martin Redish & Julie Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, 
Due Process and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. Rev 109, 128–29 (2015).  
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lexecon Inc. v. 
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), cases that are not settled either 
individually or as a result of an aggregate resolution must be returned to the district courts in which 
they were filed for final resolution. 
980 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
Group Litigation Order (GLO) in England plays a similar role in that 
jurisdiction.51 
The United States MDL provides an alternative scheme for 
aggregating mass claims when class certification is deemed 
inappropriate.  Since its inception in 1968, the number and scope of 
MDLs has grown,52 perhaps in part in response to restrictions on 
certifying class actions for mass injury claims imposed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  In Germany, steadfast opposition to the adoption of a 
class action procedure to address mass claims led to the adoption of the 
Capital Market Investors Model Proceeding” 
(Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz, popularly known as the 
KapMuG).53  Shareholders’ lawsuits arising out of the same facts and 
law can be entered in a register in a single court.  A single “model” case 
is then selected for the court to investigate and decide.  As that case 
works its way through the judicial process, action in all other cases on 
the register is stayed and the limitation period is tolled.  The liability 
decision in the model case binds all cases on the register but remedies 
must be pursued subsequently on an individual basis.  Unlike the United 
States MDL and the English GLO, both of which were intended to 
streamline pre-trial preparation of similar cases, the German procedure 
focuses on deciding the model case, a process that under German’s civil 
law encompasses multiple decision-making stages, all directed by the 
judge.  (Under the KapMuG, the case may also move frequently between 
the trial and appellate courts as key trial court decisions are appealed to 
the higher court.)  In practice, the MDL, GLO and KapMuG share the 
tactic of selecting one or a few cases for trial (called “bellwether cases” 
                                                          
 51.   CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS 29–46 (2001). 
 52.   According to John Rabiej of the Duke Law School Center for Judicial Studies, “In 2014, 
there [were] 117,647 non-asbestos cases in MDLs representing 36% of the total U.S. pending civil 
caseload.  Excluding prisoner and social security actions from the U.S. pending civil caseload, which 
typically (though not always) take little time of article III judges, the 117,647 non-asbestos cases in 
MDLs represent about 45% of the U.S. totals.”  Letter from John Rabiej, Duke Law School Center 
for Judicial Studies, to Deborah Hensler, Stanford Law School (August 29, 2014) (emphasis in 
original) (on file with author).  The proportion of pending cases that are part of a consolidated 
proceeding may somewhat overestimate the importance of MDL litigation since MDL litigation 
typically pends for a longer time than ordinary civil litigation.  The rate of MDL denials has 
increased recently. Whether this portends a sea change in the judiciary’s willingness to aggregate 
multi-district cases or is merely a random deviation remains to be seen.  Amanda Bronstad, 
Multidistrict Litigation Panels Increasing Denials Reflect Heightened Scrutiny, NAT’L L.J. (July 18, 
2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202762777589/Multidistrict-Litigation-Panels-
Increasing-Denials-Reflect-Heightened-Scrutiny?slreturn=20160901165935.  
 53.   For a description of the history and implementation of the KapMuG scheme, see Axel 
Halfmeier, Litigation Without End? The Deutsche Telekom Case and the German Approach to 
Private Enforcement of Securities Law, in CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT, supra note 1, at 279–98. 
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in the United States) and using the outcomes in those trials either to 
determine or influence the outcomes in all other cases in the group. 
An alternative to class actions and group proceedings in many 
jurisdictions is to create publicly or privately subsidized administrative 
compensation schemes for mass claims.  Japan has a long tradition of 
establishing administrative compensation schemes for mass catastrophic 
injuries.54  Several European countries have compensated asbestos 
disease victims through administrative schemes.55  The United States 
also has a long tradition of establishing special administrative 
compensation funds for victims of disease and government 
mistreatment,56 including coal miners suffering from black lung disease57 
and victims of radioactive weapons’ testing.58 
In some recent instances in Europe, corporations have funded 
administrative compensation schemes at the direction of regulatory 
authorities.  For example, in 2015, the Belgian financial market regulator 
ordered financial institutions that had sold interest rate swaps to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that suffered financial losses as a 
result of these purchases to establish a program to compensate the SMEs 
“as a commercial gesture.”59  In the Netherlands, where the financial 
regulator lacks the authority to issue an order compelling financial 
institutions to establish such a compensation scheme, it instead 
recommended to the Ministry of Finance that a “committee of 
                                                          
 54.   See, e.g., MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT: JAPAN, LESSONS LEARNED FROM MINAMATA 
DISEASE AND MERCURY (Sept. 2013), https://www.env.go.jp/chemi/tmms/pr-m/mat01/en_full.pdf; 
Eric Feldman, Compensating the Victims of Japan’s 3-11 Fukushima Disaster, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. & 
POL’Y J. 127 (2015); OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR 
NUCLEAR DAMAGE AS RELATED TO THE TEPCO DAICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT (2012), 
https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/fukushima/7089-fukushima-compensation-system-pp.pdf. 
 55.   Albert Azagra-Malo, Asbestos Injuries Compensation Funds in France and Belgium, 
SSRN (July 23, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371453. 
 56.   See, e.g., Michele L. Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of 
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 289 (2013). 
 57.   Sandy Smith, Dirty Little Secret: A Backlog of Miners’ Claims Leaves Miners Waiting for 
Help, EHS TODAY (April 14, 2015), http://ehstoday.com/msha/dirty-little-secret-backlog-black-
lung-claims-leaves-miners-waiting-help.  
 58.   Jessica Boehm, 64 Years After Nuclear Tests, Some Downwinders Still Wait for 
Compensation, CRONKITE NEWS (January 28, 2015),  http://cronkitenewsonline.com/2015/01/64-
years-after-nuclear-tests-some-downwinders-still-wait-for-compensation/.  
 59.   Correspondence with Prof. Stefaan Voet, Katholick University of Leuven (Belgium), 
October 4, 2016 (on file with author). Interest-rate swaps are tradeable derivative instruments that 
allow borrowers and lenders to exchange fixed-rate interest obligations for floating interest rate 
obligations.  Depending on fluctuations in interest rates either the borrower or lender may benefit 
from the exchange (“swap”).  Like most financial instruments traded on the market, these derivatives 
carry substantial risks.  When small and medium-sized business enterprises got into trouble as a 
result of purchasing interest rate swaps from financial institutions, questions were raised in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the U.K. about whether the transactions violated legal rules.   
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independent experts” be established to design a scheme and order the 
financial institutions to implement it.60  In another example, the 
European Commission accepted the offer of Deutsche Bahn (DB)—the 
German national railway company—to settle a competition (anti-trust) 
action brought by the Commission by changing DB’s pricing structure 
and reducing prices on railroads that were negatively affected by DB’s 
allegedly anti-competitive behavior.  Commentators have referred to this 
as an example of “regulatory redress”—i.e. compensation ordered by 
public regulators in lieu of or in addition to other sanctions.61 
Although promoted as more efficient (and perhaps fairer) approaches 
to delivering compensation to victims of external forces and events, a 
consistent pattern of complaints across administrative programs 
established to assist different sorts of victims in different countries 
suggests that in practice such programs often struggle to serve the 
purposes for which they are intended.  Often the number of eligible 
recipients who come forward as well as their needs exceed estimates 
(frequently developed in the absence of comprehensive data on how 
many people were injured and to what degree).  Programs subsidized by 
government are frequently underfunded and funding problems can 
increase as programs drag on beyond the expected date of termination. 
Programs initially funded by private entities may appeal for government 
assistance when the initial appropriation to support the fund runs out.62 
The widely-perceived success of the 9/11 compensation program, 
                                                          
 60.   Femke de Vries & Bonne van Hattam, Address at the Groningen Centre for European 
Financial Services Law conference: Financial Supervision and Civil Liability in Mass Damage 
Cases: The Case of Interest Rate Swaps in the Netherlands and the U.K., (September 30, 2016). 
 61.   Deutsche Bahn I, case no. 39678, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.  
See also European Commission, Press Release. Antitrust: Commission accepts legally binding 
commitments from Deutsche Bahn concerning pricing of traction current in Germany (December 18, 
2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1289_en.htm.  The price reduction was intended to 
compensate the other railroad companies for elevated prices during the period before DB’s new 
policies would significantly affect market pricing, not for the fact that they had paid higher prices in 
the past because of DB’s anti-competitive practices.  
 62.   For example, in 1970, Grunenthal, the German manufacturer of Contergan, a drug 
marketed to pregnant women as a remedy for “morning sickness” that was soon linked with birth 
defects, created a special purpose foundation to provide compensation to victims.  The foundation 
was initially funded with a grant from Grunenthal of 100 million Deutsche Marks, plus a 
contribution by the German government of 300 million Deutsche Marks.  As victims continued to 
come forward over the years, the foundation’s funds were depleted and the government was 
pressured to step in to provide ongoing funding.  In response to political pressure from victims in the 
past few years, Grunenthal agreed to contribute another 50 million Euros. Contergan was known as 
Thalidomide in the United States, where the U.S. Food and Drug Agency refused approval to market 
and distribute it.  I am grateful to Prof. Axel Halfmeier of Leuphana University (Germany) for 
providing the information on the German Contergan compensation scheme (correspondence on file 
with author). 
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established and subsidized by the U.S. federal government to compensate 
families of the victims of the terrorist attacks, seems to have renewed 
interest in administrative compensation schemes as an alternative to 
litigation for mass claims.  Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master who 
designed and managed the 9/11 compensation program, has since been 
called upon by corporate defendants to design programs offering 
compensation to victims of the British Petroleum Oil Spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the General Motors ignition switch defect.63  The 
attractiveness of this new breed of no-fault systems in which 
corporations without conceding legal liability offer compensation to 
victims in an effort to limit the corporation’s ultimate financial 
responsibility as well as reputational loss appears to be growing.  When 
news of Volkswagen’s scheme to fool emissions control equipment into 
thinking their diesel-powered cars complied with air quality standards 
burst on the scene, Volkswagen of America announced that it had hired 
Feinberg to manage a compensation facility along the lines of the BP 
claims facility that he administered for the British petroleum 
corporation.64  No doubt reflecting the fact that such schemes are only 
attractive to corporations when the threat of private litigation or public 
enforcement is real, Volkswagen’s German parent company asserted that 
it has no plans to offer German consumers similar access to 
compensation. 
A third alternative to class actions that has been promoted in Europe 
in an effort to divert political attention from litigation solutions is 
alternative dispute resolution outside court systems.  Although the 
European Commission to date has been unable to reach consensus on a 
mandate for member states to adopt class action procedures, in May 2013 
the Commission issued a mandate directing member states to establish by 
July 2015 alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving 
                                                          
 63.   Ross Barkan, Meet Ken Feinberg: The Master of Disasters, NEW YORK OBSERVER (March 
9, 2016), http://observer.com/2016/03/meet-ken-feinberg-the-master-of-disasters/.  Feinberg also 
administered government-sponsored programs for victims of the Boston Marathon bombings and 
victims of mass shootings in schools and entertainment venues.   
 64.   Chris Woodyard, Volkswagen Hires Kenneth Feinberg to Handle Diesel Cases, USA 
TODAY (December 18, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/12/17/volkswagen-
kenneth-feinberg/77495258/; Martine Powers, Ken Feinberg on VW: I will Have Ultimate Authority, 
POLITICO (January 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-
transportation/2016/01/kenneth-feinberg-on-vw-i-will-have-ultimate-authority-more-takata-inflators-
deemed-defective-dmv-survives-the-snowpocalypse-212326; Ken Feinberg on the Volkswagen 
Compensation Fund Process, BLOOMBERG NEWS (February 12, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-02-12/ken-feinberg-on-the-volkswagen-
compensation-fund-process.  
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consumer disputes outside their court systems.65  The lengthy directive 
(which was accompanied by a directive to establish on-line dispute 
resolution mechanisms for cross-border online purchases) spelled out in 
great detail the issues member states need to consider in designing 
procedures to assure their fairness to consumers and traders.66  Among 
the advocates for the consumer ADR directive were corporate lobbyists 
who hoped that the mandate would impede the development of a 
European Commission directive for member states to adopt class action 
procedures for economic disputes. 
Studies published in the run-up to the adoption of the consumer ADR 
directive uncovered a host of existing out-of-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms in European countries, operated by private businesses, trade 
associations, and public entities.67  As is true also in the United States, 
assembling data to assess the performance of these mechanisms was 
difficult, perhaps contributing to the provisions in the European 
Commission’s consumer ADR directive mandating the collection and 
publication of performance statistics.68  Missing from the published 
research is any discussion of the existing mechanisms’ ability to deal 
with mass claims that arise within relatively short time periods (as in the 
Volkswagen debacle).  Anecdotal evidence from the United States 
suggests that like courts,69 out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms 
struggle to dispose of such claims expeditiously, for much the same 
reasons as challenge court dispute resolution systems. 
 
                                                          
 65.   2013 O.J. (L 165) 32013L0011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0011 
 66.   Interestingly, in the light of the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence upholding mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesive contracts—including clauses that bar claimants from 
proceeding collectively in any forum—the European Commission’s directive specifies that an 
“agreement between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints to an ADR entity is not binding 
on the consumer if it was concluded before the dispute has materialized and if it has the effect of 
depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action before the courts for the settlement of the 
dispute.” Directive 2013/11/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63, 74–75. 
 67.   CHRISTOPHER HODGES ET. AL., CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE (2012). 
 68.   2013 O.J. (L 165) at 77. 
 69.   See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 339–98 (2000) (describing the inability of corporate complaint resolution 
mechanisms to address customers’ complaints about property damage due to faulty construction 
products when the mechanisms received massive numbers of such complaints). 
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V.  CONSEQUENCES 
Given the sharp and protracted controversy that has accompanied the 
introduction of class actions in virtually all jurisdictions,70 and the 
important concerns that have been raised about potential uses and abuses 
of collective litigation, one might expect that jurisdictions would be 
carefully tallying the frequency and circumstances in which class actions 
are filed and collecting systematic information about class action 
outcomes.71  Alas, that is not the case.  To my knowledge, no jurisdiction 
publishes official statistics on the number of complaints filed in which 
plaintiffs seek to proceed collectively.  No one knows how many class 
actions are filed annually in federal or state courts in the United States, 
much less the characteristics or outcomes of these cases.72  Professors 
Vince Morabito and Alon Klement have compiled comprehensive 
databases on the number class filings in Australia73 and Israel74 
                                                          
 70.   Stefaan Voet, Deborah Hensler & Vince Morabito, Class Actions Across the Atlantic: 
From Guarded Interest to European Policy, in process (on file with author). 
 71.   One might imagine a jurisdiction deciding to adopt a class action on a “trial” basis and 
commission research to study objective and subjective outcomes.  This type of research was 
commissioned by state and federal courts in the United States to assess the consequences of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures, and by Congress in 1990 to assess the outcomes of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (a package of civil procedure reforms intended to expedite civil 
litigation and reduce its expense). For a review of empirical research on alternative dispute 
resolution programs, see Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How ADR is Transforming the 
U.S. Court System, 108 PENN STATE L. REV. 165 (2003). On research commissioned by Congress to 
evaluate the consequences of the Civil Justice Reform Act, see JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., AN 
EVALUATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1990).  However, 
investing in serious research on civil procedure reform seems to have gone out of favor in the United 
States. 
 72.   On the lack of empirical data on U.S. class actions and reasons for this lack, see Deborah 
Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You Better After All This Time?, U. 
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 73.   Vince Morabito, An Empirical Study Of Australia’s Class Action Regimes, First Report: 
Class Action Facts And Figures, (Dec. 2009), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Australia_Empirical_Morabito_2
009_Dec.pdf; Vince Morabito, An Empirical Study Of Australia’s Class Action Regimes, Second 
Report: Litigation Funders, Competing Class Actions, Opt Out Rates, Victorian Class Actions And 
Class Representatives, (Sept. 2010), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Vince%20Morabito%202nd%20
Report.pdf [hereinafter Morabito 2010]; Vince Morabito, An Empirical Study of Australia’s Class 
Action Regimes, Third Report: Class Action Facts and Figures—Five Years Later (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523275 [hereinafter Morabito 2014]; Vince 
Morabito, An Empirical Study of Australia’s Class Action Regimes, Fourth Report: Facts and 
Figures on Twenty-Four Years of Class Actions in Australia, (Aug. 3, 2016).  
 74.   Alon Klement et al., Class Actions in Israel—An Empirical Perspective, (2014), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/Research%20Division/doc%5C25122014.pdf [hereinafter Klement 
2014].  See also Alon Klement & Keren Weinshall, Cost Benefit Analysis of Class Actions: An 
Israeli Perspective, 172 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 75 (2016). 
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respectively, which permit observation of trends in filings and provide 
some additional data on the characteristics of their cases and outcomes.  
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller75 and Brian 
Fitzpatrick76 have compiled comprehensive databases on federal class 
action settlements and attorney fee awards that permit analysis of the 
relationship between negotiated settlement amounts and fee awards and 
differences in settlements and fees across different case types.  Several 
private entities monitor filings of shareholder (securities) class actions in 
Australia, Canada and the United States.  But some private databases are 
unrepresentative or incomplete and because the data do not have a 
government imprimatur they are subject to challenge, particularly when 
relied on in heated debates over adopting or amending collective 
procedures. 
Morabito found that from 1992 (when Australia’s federal class action 
statute became effective) to 2014, 329 class actions were filed, an 
average of fifteen per year.  Annual filings diminished in the second half 
of this period, by comparison to the earlier period, and the composition 
of the class action caseload shifted, so that in the more recent period 
shareholder suits predominated.  The shift to shareholder suits likely 
reflects the increasing importance of third-party funding in Australia’s 
class action practice.  Class action filings appear to represent less than 1 
percent of all federal civil filings in Australia.77 
Klement found that from 2008 (when Israel’s comprehensive class 
action statute became effective) to 2012 (the most recent year for which 
he compiled data), annual class action filings rose steadily, peaking at 
820.  A total of 2,004 class action lawsuits were filed from 2007–2012.  
Consumer cases accounted for about three-quarters of the Israeli class 
action caseload.78 
Surprisingly, the per capita rate of class action filings appeared 
higher in Israel than in the United States.79  A decade ago, I estimated the 
number of class actions filed in the federal and state courts in the United 
                                                          
 75.   Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action 
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010). 
 76.   Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010). 
 77.   Hensler, Enforce Marketplace Regulations, supra note 8, at 251, 253 (summarizing 
Morabito 2010 and Morabito 2014, supra note 59).  Contrary to claims by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, there is no evidence that third-party funding has increased the frequency of ordinary or 
class action lawsuits.  Hensler, Third-Party Financing, supra note 8, at 499, 524. 
 78.   Hensler, Enforce Marketplace Regulations, supra note 8, at 252–53 (summarizing 
Klement 2014, supra note 60). 
 79.   Id. at 252. 
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States by piecing together incomplete data; according to that estimate, 
about 6,500 class action complaints were then being filed, about one 
percent of the total civil damage caseload in state and federal courts.80 
Data from civil law jurisdictions regarding cases filed under their 
more recently enacted class action and group proceedings statutes are 
sparse.  Tzankova and associates report that there have been between 300 
and 400 cases filed under the Netherland’s collective litigation statute 
(which does not provide monetary remedies) since its inception in 1995, 
and 9 petitions for approval of collective settlements negotiated under its 
collective settlement statute (WCAM) (which does provide money 
damages) since it was enacted in 2005.81  Halfmeier reports that there 
have been about twenty five cases filed using the German KapMuG 
procedure since it was adopted in 2005, most of which are still in 
process.82 
Taken together these data suggest that in common law jurisdictions 
class actions are used sparingly (relative to the size of national caseloads 
of civil damage litigation) and tend to rise and fall in response to broader 
economic trends, as well as with precedential decisions.  There is no 
evidence of class actions overwhelming any country’s civil justice 
system.  The small numbers of class actions and other collective 
proceedings filed in civil law jurisdictions likely reflect the combined 
effects of recent adoption and financial disincentives to bring such cases.  
As time goes on, those jurisdictions might or might not experience a 
rising tide of collective lawsuits. 
Mere numbers of class actions filed by jurisdiction do not of course 
suffice to evaluate the merits and demerits of collective litigation, nor 
whether some forms of collective procedure are more effective at 
delivering compensation, produce fairer outcomes for claimants and 
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DEBORAH HENSLER, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW, (Geraint 
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systems. 
 81.   Correspondence with Prof. Ianika Tzankova, Tilburg University (Netherlands), October 
2016 (on file with author). 
 82.   Correspondence with Prof. Axel Halfmeier, Leuphana University (Germany) October 
2016 (on file with author). 
988 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
defendants or—in jurisdictions that perceive private litigation as properly 
supplementing regulatory enforcement—contribute positively to 
regulating the behavior of market actors.  The globalization of class 
actions has produced a “natural experiment” of the type that law and 
economic scholars frequently rely on to assess the outcomes of 
alternative legal policies.  Unfortunately, we have yet to see such 
research on the consequences of adopting class action procedures either 
here in the United States or in other parts of the world. 
 
